Increased difficulty in moving up the farm job ladder came to be seen as a problem in the United States in the early decades of the twentieth century as the fraction of farm operators who were owners fell. Concerns were voiced about the continued viability of American agriculture as the number of renters, sharecroppers, and laborers rose. As the "agricultural ladder" (the progression from laborer to cropper to renter to owner) seemingly became more difficult to ascend, commentators feared for the quality of the soil and for the quality of the nation's farmers. Similar concerns motivate much of the interest in farm tenancy and land reform in developing countries today.
INTRODUCTION
Tenancy has been a prominent feature of agriculture since before the Roman Empire. Yet we know little about the dynamics of the mobility that individuals experience as they move among tenure classes. What makes it easier for a sharecropper or renter to become an owner?
How likely were renters to fall in status and become sharecroppers or laborers? And how long did movement up the farm hierarchy take? Though we now know a great deal about tenanc y from cross-sectional studies, little is known about its role in the careers of individual farmers.
This study provides longitudinal evidence for American farmers in the early twentieth century and offers a glimpse at the forces shaping it.
A better understanding of the forces shaping mobility in agriculture will produce several benefits. The first is a more realistic picture of the experience of individual farmers. For example, one of the problems associated with tenancy is inadequate attention to the lon g-run viability of the land if they are short term renters rather than long -term tenants or owners. If tenants expect a long tenure as a residual claimant or if they believe that they will themselves own the land, their incentive to mine the soil is reduced. Farmers also have greater incentives to accumulate physical and human capital than a static cross-sectional analysis would suggest if there is a realistic possibility of rising to tenancy or ownership.
A better understanding of the extent of tenure mobility can also shed light on views toward redistributive policies. Americans may accept greater income inequality than Europeans because there exists a greater likelihood in the United States that individuals will increase their income or otherwise improve their status over time.
1 In short, the United States has been (and is)
perceived as the "land of opportunity." This popular notion has much anecdotal support but it is difficult to test. 2 The notion of the U.S. as a land of opportunity came under attack in the early twentieth century as the agricultural sector suffered through two decades of high farm failures in the 1920s and 1930s. 3 We will assess the causes of mobility in agriculture at the individual -level and how the First World War and Depression affected mobility.
Finally, knowing more about career mobility in farming will contribute to our understanding of the geographic and occupational mobility of Americans more generally. Studies of occupational mobility have focused on urban settings where movem ent from worse to better occupations is easy to identify. But until 1920, more Americans lived in rural places than in urban ones, and even as late as the 1940s agriculture accounted for nearly a quarter of the employed labor force. 4 We know little about how much improvement people could expect when they remained in the farm sector, though that expectation no doubt shaped their decisions regarding movement from farms to towns and cities. Though this movement was dramatic in the case of some groups (such as blacks), we know far more about the circumstances they faced in the urban places to which they moved than about the opportunities for advancement (or the lack of such opportunities) in the rural places they left. An understanding of the dynamics of the agricultural ladder will tell us more about the circumstances faced at their point of origin by the millions who abandoned farming for urban pursuits in the first decades of the twentieth century.
II. THE FARM TENANCY "PROBLEM" IN THE 20 TH CENTURY U.S.
Movement from rung to rung has been predominantly in the direction of descent rather than ascent…[There is] an increasing tendency for the rungs of the ladder to become bars-forcing imprisonment in a fixed social status from which it is increasingly difficult to escape.
1 On the trade-off between mobility and redistribution, see the review by Putterman, Roemer, and Sylvestre (1996) . 2 For an attempt to assess the link between perceptions of social mobility and preferences for redistributive policies, see Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) . 3 On the magnitude and causes of farm distress in the interwar period, see Alston (1983 Allen attributed a large part of the rise in tenancy to the increased use of croppers instead of farm 5 The U.S. census defined tenancy rates as the number of sharecroppers plus share and fixed rent tenants as a percentage of the number of operators, defined as the number of sharecroppers, share and fixed renters plus owners. The census did not include wage workers as part of farm operators. In our tenancy figures in the text we exclude shareroppers because of our belief that sharecroppers were more akin to wage workers than tenants. If we include sharecroppers as tenants the percentage of tenancy in the South reached 56% in 1930. See Alston and Kauffman (1997) for estimates of croppers in 1900 and 1910 and revised estimates of "true tenancy." 6 See for example the excellent studies by L.C. Gray et al. (1924) and E.A. Goldenweiser and Leon E. Truesdell (1924). laborers in the South. 7 Black and Allen believed that there was little social or economic distinction between croppers and laborers whereas Schuler considered croppers to be on a higher rung of the agricultural ladder than laborers though still closer to the rung of laborer than that of share or fixed-rent tenants.
Consistent with the economists in the USDA in the 1920s, both Black and Allen and
Schuler believed that to understand the tenancy issue required looking at all the rungs of the agricultural ladder (wage laborer, cropper, tenant, and owner) and then assessing the causes of movements up, down, and off the ladder. On the basis of census data (or at times educated guesswork), Black and Allen reached several conclusions: 1) the rate of ascent on the agricultural ladder was relatively constant over the first three decades of the twentieth century, but entrants started at lower rungs over time; 2) there was considerable variation across regions (mostly accounted for by differences in crops) in the number of farmers on each rung; 3)
prosperity or depression (the 1890s and the interwar period) were major determinants of the number of farmers on each rung; and 4) croppers were on the decline in t he 1930s as a result of tractorization, relief work, and the policies of the Agricultural Adjustment Acts. Black and Allen had to rely on their intuition for several of their conclusions because the Census has never systematically collected data on full-time laborers. This issue has hampered research on the agricultural ladder because changes in tenancy (including sharecroppers) could result from either movements out of or into the wage labor category or movements into or out of the ownership category. On these movements rest many welfare implications concerning not only the farm sector in the historical U.S. but also in developing and transition economies.
Schuler more systematically addressed the tenancy question through a survey in 1938 of 7 Most scholars in the 1920s and 1930s were well aware of the important distinction between croppers and tenants. The census continued to consider croppers a subgroup of tenants, "yet nothing could be more misleading than such a 2,700 farmers in two of the major farming regions in the U.S., the cotton and corn belts. The surveys produced occupational and locational histories of the farmers along with individual characteristics of the farmers: year and place of birth, father's tenure status, ye ars of schooling, age at leaving home, years and amounts of any inheritance, marital status, and relationship to the landowner. By looking at aggregated regional averages and using bivariate ocular regression techniques (i.e., eyeballing the data), Schuler reached several general conclusions: 1) there was considerable variation across regions and between races in movements up and down the agricultural ladder; 2) inheritance caused a substantial boost up the agricultural ladder; and 3) education provided more of a boost for black southern farmers than for northern or southern white farmers.
Prior to Schuler, L. C. Gray et al. (1924) addressed the issue of farm mobility. Using data from the 1920 Census of Agriculture, the authors found that for the U.S. as a w hole, 42% of farmers who became tenants between 1915 and 1920 had previously worked for wages, while 47% started their careers as tenants [Gray et al. (1924): 553-554] . The percentage of tenants who never worked for wages was much higher in the South because of the census classification of croppers as tenants. Consistent with this interpretation, Gray et al. found that the average ages at which farm laborers became farm tenants was lowest in the South, though counting croppers as tenants. They also found signs of falling down the agricultural ladder: in 1920 for the U.S. as a whole, eleven percent of farm tenants had once been owners. This fraction was as high as onethird in some of the Rocky Mountain and desert states [Gray et al. (1924) : 556]. The authors also track the length of time spent at various rungs on the agricultural ladder prior to reaching ownership. Typically, the longer a state had been occupied, the longer it took to become an owner. The authors caution not to attach welfare implications to the varying periods of time it grouping." [Brandt (1938) , p. 24].
takes to reach ownership. They argued that several factors account for the increase in tenancy:
time spent in education prior to farming, different capital requirements, and different age structures of the resident population.
II. JEFFERSON COUNTY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COTTON REGION
In our own work we can better assess the determinants of movements on the agricultural ladder than our predecessors could in the 1920s and 1930s, or our contemporaries can today. To see the representativeness of the Jefferson County data, Table 1 compares the characteristics of farmers in the sample to all the farms in
Jefferson County, to all the farms in Arkansas, and to the cotton belt states (Arkansas, Alabama, Tennessee, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, and South Carolina). In most respects, the sample straddles the data for the county and the state. This is the result of the sampling strategy used by Schuler's team: it sought responses from tenure classes that corresponded to the shares of those classes engaged in cotton farming. The career mobility seen in our Jefferson County sample data is also representative of mobility in the rest of the South. When the extent of career mobility among tenure classes in our sample data from Jefferson County is compared in Table 3 to tenure mobility for the entire South in Schuler's published tables, it is clear that Jefferson County looks much like th e rest of the cotton regions in the South. For example, in both Jefferson County and in the whole South, 85 9 We stress, though, the small sample size (6) from the Public Use Sample for 1900.
percent of those who started their careers as owners remained owners at the end of their careers, while just under a third of those who started as renters ended up in a higher status (as owners). 
III. HYPOTHESES
The literature on agricultural tenancy is vast but the hypotheses that address why some agricultural workers are wage laborers, sopme are croppers, and some are tenants can be divided into five categories: 1) endowments and their impact on supervision costs; 2) enforcement costs;
3) risk; 4) agricultural distress; and 5) government policies. We present an overall assessment of the hypotheses at work even though in this paper, we will test only a subset of the hypotheses.
Supervision Costs
As farmers ascend the agricultural ladder, landlords have a decreasing need to supervise the labor effort of farmers. As labor moves from wageworker to cropper to tenant and ultimately to ownership, the share of net output going to the operator increases, which increases the incentive for work effort. The contractual form chosen will be closely related to the incentive for the landowner to monitor work effort. It is not only labor effort in the fields that needs to be monitored. Individuals have an incentive to monitor the use of all assets that they bring to the production process, though labor-monitoring costs can be considered a residual to the monitoring of the other assets.
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Consider the following simplified production process for cotton. Output is a function of land (quantity and quality), physical capital (a mule or horse or tractor), human capital of the farm owner and operator, and labor effort. We assume that the market for inputs is competitive and endowments vary across farmers, e.g., some farmers have land and mules and are looking to hire labor, and some labor has farm experience and a mule and is searching for land. How do suppliers and demanders of inputs match up? This is best illustrated with an example. Suppose a resident farm owner with considerable farming experience and a mule is looking for a laborer.
He is willing to supply all the inputs except labor effort. Given his endowmen t, what would be the best match? He would search for a laborer who has no capital and little farming experience.
In this way, he would get the best return on his human and physical capital. In this situation, the farmer has an incentive to be in the fields to monitor his physical capital (the mule in particular)
to prevent its depreciation, and to furnish directions (human capital). Given the presence of the landlord for these reasons, the marginal cost of monitoring labor effort is low; there are economies of scope in monitoring. 11 When workers are endowed with more physical or human capital, the landlord cannot benefit from such economies of scope; as a result the direct costs of monitoring the labor effort of these workers is greater than for workers with less capital. To reduce the costs of monitoring better-endowed workers, landlords will negotiate contracts higher on the agricultural ladder. Similarly if certain crops are more soil -depleting, e.g., row crops compared to grain crops, then owners will have an incentive to limit output. One mechanism is to negotiate more share relative to fixed-rent contracts because the tenant will have less incentive to maximize short-run yields at the expense of long-run soil fertility.
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An important means of acquiring physical capital is an inheritance. An inheritance could enable a worker to purchase a mule, thereby increasing the likelihood of being a tenant, or if the inheritance is more substantial it may enable a tenant to purchase a farm and ascend to the owner rung.
From our data we can construct several proxies for the human and physical capital of landlords and workers. For our Jefferson County farmers, we have the following measures of 11 Alston and Higgs (1982) developed the hypotheses about economies of scope in monitoring. Similar to Alston and Higgs, Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) provide an endowment model of managerial ability to explain the mix of contracts -fixed-wage, share, and fixed-rent. 12 Allen and Lueck (1992) found evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
human capital: age, marital status, schooling, years on farm, and years in the county. Workers who are older, married, better schooled, longer on their present farm, or longer in the county or state should be at higher rungs on the agricultural ladder. For the physical capital of labor and landlords, we have the year and amount of any inheritances. To the extent labor has greater capital, they should be on higher rungs, whereas if landlords supply more capital then they should hire workers on lower rungs of the ladder to take advantage of the economies of scope in monitoring.
Enforcement Costs
Enforcement costs of labor effort result from efforts to ensure an adequate labor supply during peak demand, which for cotton is the harvest. During peak demand, piece rates and day wages increase giving an incentive for some workers to abandon their current employment.
Higher tenure status decreases the incentive for abandonment because higher tenure status brings with it expected higher post-harvest remuneration. The enforcement costs to landlords increase as labor becomes scarcer. As such, boom times, e.g., the war years, should be associated with ascension up the agricultural ladder and conversely depression years should be associated with movements down the ladder. Of course we need to control for increases and decreases in physical capital that accompany good and bad times in agriculture. With our survey data, we can examine the impact of the war years. Conversely, we can examine the impact of the lessening of off-farm opportunities associated with increasing unemployment during the 1 930s.
13 Allen and Lueck (1999) argue that yield variability affects the ability of share tenants to cheat landlords by underreporting the output. As such, they expect to observe more fixed -rent contracts where yields are more variable. We will be able to e xamine yield variability but only at 13 Alston (1981) found that wage contracts were more prevalent in regions with a more abundant supply of farm labor.
the county level. Holding yields constant, we expect cheating to be more difficult with cotton than most other crops because of ginning at a central location. Therefore, ceteris paribus, we should see more share contracts for cotton.
Risk
Although price and yield risk have long been suggested as a reason for sharing output, we need to posit relatively greater risk aversion by one party to the contract in order to derive testable hypotheses, because both parties have an incentive to shed risk, e.g., fixed renters would prefer to be share renters and landlords would prefer to have more fixed renters relative to share tenants. Most of the authors in the principal-agent literature assume risk-neutral landlords and risk-averse tenants. 14 We expect that in a riskier environment there will be a movement from fixed rent to share rent and when risk decreases we expect a movement from share rent to fixed rent. To measure yield risk for our Jefferson County sample we have the years of boll-weevil infestation in the region. Price risk will be captured by the years following the introduction of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which set a floor for the price of cotton. 
Agricultural Distress
The war years brought boom times to agriculture whereas the inter-war years witnessed unparalleled levels of farm failures. Prosperity on the farm should affect all rungs of the ladder.
Prosperity should enable wage workers and croppers to accumulate the capital necessary to 14 For a discussion of the role of risk in agricultural contracts, see Allen and Lueck (1999) . They find little evidence for the role of risk in shaping tenancy arrangements. Our analysis of the South, where credit institutions were less fully developed and methods other than tenancy arrangements for sharing risk were less often available, will provide a useful contrast to their study. Another difference between our sample and that of Allen and Lueck (1999) is differences in wealth between landlords and tenants. In their sample there are few differences in wealth between tenants and landlords but there is considerable difference in our sample. Our tests will have more implications for the role of risk in developing countries where the differences in wealth between landlords and tenants are high. 15 In future work we plan to utilize county-level observations for the entire agricultural U.S. For that study we will be able to test for the importance of yields. The 1920 Census also includes a breakdown for the South between standing renters (who paid rent with a fixed amount of output) and cash renters (who paid a fixed amount of cash). For the northern counties the Census also provides a breakdown on share and share-cash tenants.
become tenants. Farm distress in the form of farm foreclosures affects the highest levels of the tenure ladder. When foreclosure rates are high, we should see some of our owners fall to the tenant rung or at times all the way to wage laborer. Correspondingly, high foreclosur e rates bring low farm prices and some of our tenants may ascend to the ownership rung. Similiarly, for tenants a bad year may entail having to sell a mule and falling to the cropper rung, while for croppers depressed mule prices may enable some to climb to the tenant rung. Whether falling down or rising up the agricultural ladder dominates is an empirical question. With our sample from Jefferson County we will be able to compare the time spent as a wage earner or cropper compared to time as a tenant for good and bad years.
Government Policies
Throughout the period of our study, blacks lacked civil rights. Local and state governments condoned if not assisted in maintaining the South as "an armed camp for intimidating black folk." 16 Under these conditions, blacks had an incentive to enter into a paternalistic relationship in which a powerful patron would provide protection from physical abuses in return for good and faithful labor (Alston and Ferrie, 1999) . To maintain a paternalistic relationship, blacks may have foregone some opportunities for advancement that would require relocation. The safest and surest way for blacks to ascend the ladder was to have a longstanding paternalistic relationship with a landlord. An implication of this is that blacks would ascend the agricultural ladder slower than similarly endowed whites. With our Jefferson County sample we will be able to compare the tenure experiences of whites and blacks.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was the federal government's answer to t he woes of farmers in the Great Depression. Under the AAA, the federal government paid participating farmers a minimum price for their cotton for setting aside acreage. The initial program in May 1933 (affecting contracts in 1934) mandated that benefit che cks be divided between landlords and their tenants (fixed-rent and share) and sharecroppers. Whatley (1983) and Wright (1986) argued that this provided an incentive for landlords to negotiate more wage contracts and fewer tenant and cropper contracts. Alston (1981 Alston ( , 1987 Alston ( , and 1989 has argued that demotion down the ladder alters the distribution of risk and supervision such that it may have been less costly either to "cheat" labor or to adjust some other margin of the contract, e.g., reduce the fraction of share contracts or reduce the size of plots, rather than negotiate more wage contracts. 17 Simply changing the rules does not change the value of labor and the benefit checks should accrue to the most inelastically supplied factor to the production process, namely land.
In 1934 (affecting contracts in 1935), the Agricultural Adjustment Administration stipulated that benefit payments should only go to fixed-rent and managing share tenants, thereby excluding croppers. If the rules mattered, we should see a decline in tenants for 1935. In 1935, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration again changed its program. Once again, the rules stipulated that benefits were to go to croppers as well as tenants. As a result, if the rules could be enforced at low cost, we should observe an increase in wage labor at the expense of croppers and tenants in 1936 and 1937.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DYNAMICS OF THE AGRICULTURAL LADDER
We are most interested in the dynamics of ascent and descent on the ladder. For agriculture, ascension on the ladder is the best indicator of economic mobility because as workers ascend, their incomes increase. For example, Blalock (1937) reports average net income in 1934 for agricultural workers in the Arkansas River plantation region of $226 for wage workers, $233 for sharecroppers, and $386 for tenants. These figures include adjustments for "home use products." The income of wage laborers and sharecroppers was thus similar, but the step up to tenant represented an income increase of 66%. The real earni ngs of wage laborers and sharecroppers compare favorably to wages received by unskilled workers in manfacuturing until 1933 when New Deal policies boosted relative manufacturing wages though at the expense of increased urban unemployment. 18 In income terms, the step up to tenant was similar to moving from the unskilled to the skilled category in manufacturing.
To simplify our analysis, we will focus on only black workers who started their agricultural careers as either wage workers, sharecroppers, or tenan ts. During the period we examine, blacks in the South faced overt social and legal discrimination. 19 To the extent that we find mobility, it is testimony to the hard work of individuals within a competitive market environment. 20 Our sample consists of individuals who have 3,605 opportunities for ascent or descent from year to year. In Table 5 we show the yearly movements from rung to rung. Overall, stasis is the most likely outcome. Wage workers are the most mobile with 12% moving yearly to the sharecropper rung, 3% to tenancy, and 1% to ownership. Sharecroppers are more likely to move up than down the ladder: 1.4% of the yearly movement is into the wage category and 5% is into tenancy or ownership. This is somewhat surprising given that 25% of our moves are i n depression years. Though 94% of the possible movement for tenants is stasis, the downward mobility to sharecropper or wage is about 2.5% points greater than the upward movement to ownership. Because 44% of the possible moves for all categories are from t he sharecropper rung, encouraged wage contracting (Alston, 1981) . 18 For estimates of the earnings gap between agricultural and manufacturing laborers for 1925 to 1941, see Alston and Hatton (1991) . 19 See Alston and Ferrie (1999) .
upward mobility exceeded downward mobility overall. In Table 6 we present descriptive statistics for the sample that we use in our regression analysis. Wage workers tend to be younger than sharecroppers or tenants but there are large standard deviations. There is considerable variation across our individuals in time spent on a rung. Some are clearly on the fast track while others never move from the wage worker category.
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About half of our possible moves occur during the Depression years of 1930 -1937 . War years (1914 -1918 account for 28% of our moves. In Table 7 we present the regression results from an ordered probit estimation, with the standard errors corrected for clustering. 22 In order to account for the high degree of stasis shown in Table 5 , we estimate the probability that an individual i was in tenure category j (=laborer, cropper, tenant, owner) at time t, P ij (t), as a function of his characteristics at time t, X i (t), and his tenure status at time t-1, P ij (t-1). This is a first-order Markov chain:
where is a vector of coefficients to estimate and i (t) is a random error term. The individual's previous tenure status is introduced by including interactions between dummies for having been a cropper or tenant at time t-1 into the ordered probit regression (with the interaction with the dummy for having been a laborer at time t-1 the omitted interaction). To take advantage of the panel structure of the data (with repeated observations on the same individuals over a number of years), we correct the standard errors for clustering, allowing i (t) to be correlated over t within the career of any individual i. 0.001 0.003 -0.004 Underlying coefficient significant at 10%; 5%; 1% Marginal effect significant at * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% Note: The sample is restricted to Blacks who were Laborers, Croppers, or Tenants at time t-1. â are the ordered probit regression coefficients. Pr(L t )/ X j is the change in the probability (evaluated at the sample means) of becoming a Laborer at time t associated with a one unit change in the variable X j . The marginal effects for becoming a Cropper (C) or Tenant (T) are defined analogously. For the interactions, Cropper t-1 and Tenant t-1 are individuals who were Croppers and Tenants at time t-1. Laborers at time t-1 are the excluded category. The regression uses the Huber-White sandwich estimator to adjust the variance-covariance matrix to correct for correlated responses from cluster samples (Huber, P.J., Proc Fifth Berkeley Symposium Math Stat 1:221 33, 1967; White, H.,. Econometrica 50:1 25, 1982 ).
The estimates demonstrate that agriculture provided some upward mobility for blacks in the cotton belt. A standard deviation increase in age for black wage workers increased the likelihood of moving to the cropper rung by 22 percentage points. The wage category for some blacks was a fast track to economic opportunity whereas for others it was a dead end. As it does for wage workers, individual variation in initiative or good luck influences the movement of croppers. Age does not influence moving from sharecropper to tenant but it does decrease the likelihood of falling down to the cropper rung. For tenants, age reduces the likelihood of falling down the ladder. This is consistent with the view that over time tenants accumulated physical capital to weather a few bad years. A standard deviation increase in age for tenants reduces the likelihood of falling down the ladder by 36 percentage points.
The Depression hit tenants the hardest. 23 In each year of the Depression, tenants had a thirteen percentage point increased likelihood of falling down the ladder, though the Depression did not influence the mobility of wage workers or croppers. Given that an important factor for moving from wage or cropper to becoming a tenant was a mule, those tenants without spare resources most likely were forced to sell their mule in bad crop years.
The war years generally enhanced mobility though not always positively. Wage workers had a six percentage point greater likelihood of becoming sharecroppers but a decreased likelihood of becoming tenants. Sharecroppers faced the same probability of moving up or down.
For tenants, the likelihood of falling down the ladder was small, which is what we expected given the high wartime prices of cotton.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the legal and social discrimination faced by blacks in the plantation South in the early part of the twentieth century, there was some economic mobility. The war years increased the likelihood of rising to the tenant rung, which is analagous to the skilled labor category in manufacturing. Symetrically, the Depression years increased the likelihood of falling from the tenant category to the sharecropper or wage level. We also find some evidence of an upward sloping age tenure profile, though the magnitude of the effect of age is not as great as the magnitude of unobserved individual effects. For many, a career in agriculture was akin to climbing with the aid of an escalator while for others it was like Sisyphus pushing his rock up the mountain. 24 The difference between ascension or entrapment was individual initiative or good luck.
